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Neither Panacea, Placebo, Nor 
Poison: Examining the Rise of 
Anti-Unemployment 
Discrimination Laws 
 
Seth Katsuya Endo* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Since 2009, the unemployment rate in the United States 
has remained above eight percent, which means that more 
than twelve million individuals have been looking for work at 
any given time. With so many affected individuals, 
unemployment has become an issue of public concern, 
particularly as stories describing employers refusing to 
consider currently unemployed candidates for job opportunities 
have proliferated. In response to these trends, about twenty 
states and the federal government have passed, or are 
considering, legislation designed to prohibit employers from 
discriminating against individuals based on their employment 
status. 
Although several bills already have been enacted to date, 
nearly all of the articles on this subject have been authored by 
members of various law firms’ employment practices.1 These 
articles primarily focus on the legislative activity, discussing 
what employers need to know to anticipate and avoid liability. 
The one scholarly article that deals with this issue takes the 
mirror-image approach in that it primarily echoes the policy 
positions of employee-rights advocates and does not examine 
 
  * Seth Katsuya Endo received his J.D. from New York University School 
of Law in 2007. In addition to working in private practice, he has clerked for 
several federal and state judges. 
1. See, e.g., Katharine H. Parker & Daniel L. Saperstein, Emerging 
Issues in Hiring—Employer Screening Processes, 18 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & 
PRACTICAL GUIDANCE 5, art. 2, (Sept./Oct. 2012). 
1
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the specifics of any of the proposed or enacted bills.2 
The goal of this Article is to survey the legislative activity, 
identify the factors driving it, and analyze its potential 
ramifications. I contend that it is unreasonable to project that 
this legislation will significantly reduce unemployment because 
there is only anecdotal data regarding the prevalence of 
discrimination against unemployed candidates in hiring and, 
regardless of the frequency of such a practice, none of the 
proposed or enacted legislation directly promotes job creation. 
However, I argue that the anti-unemployment discrimination 
legislation is a positive example of interest convergence in that 
it benefits the economy by reducing arbitrary discrimination in 
hiring and long-term unemployment. Furthermore, such 
legislation expresses a set of positive societal values and 
protects members of constitutionally-protected groups who are 
likely disproportionately impacted by current-employment 
requirements. I then discuss why the concerns advanced by the 
business community are overstated given the generally limited 
scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and 
the legally-approved uses of employment status as a proxy for 
characteristics about which a business might reasonably care. 
In sum, when taking an objective look, the anti-unemployment 
discrimination legislation is neither panacea, placebo, nor 
poison. 
 
II. Background 
 
A. Unemployment in the U.S. 
 
In January 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
estimated that more than twelve million Americans, or about 
eight percent of the civilian labor force, were unemployed.3 
Approximately five million of these individuals had been out of 
 
2. See Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Have a Job to Get a Job: Disparate Treatment 
and Disparate Impact of the “Currently Employed” Requirement, 18 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 189 (2012). 
3. News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment 
Situation- January 2013, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_02012013.pdf. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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work for more than twenty-seven weeks.4 
In terms of distribution, the unemployment rate for whites 
was 7 percent, while the rates for blacks and Hispanics were 
13.8 and 9.7 percent, respectively.5 The unemployment rates 
for adult men and for adult women were both 7.3 percent.6 The 
unemployment rate for the disabled was 13.7 percent against 
8.3 percent for individuals without any disabilities.7 On the 
whole, unemployment rates for older individuals was slightly 
lower than the rates for their younger cohorts but a much 
larger percentage of older unemployed individuals are long-
term unemployed.8 
Political polls reflect these numbers with unemployment 
dominating as an area of concern. In September 2012, seventy-
two percent of respondents in a national Gallup poll stated that 
economic problems are the most important problem facing the 
country today.9 Thirty-two percent of the total respondents 
specifically identified “unemployment/jobs.”10 In a related 
Gallup poll, more than three-quarters of respondents said that 
it is a bad time to find a quality job.11 Black, Hispanic, senior, 
and low-income respondents were particularly concerned about 
unemployment.12 
 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at Table A-6. 
8. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE 
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (Feb. 5, 2013), 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat03.htm; see also Sylvia Allegretto & Devon 
Lynch, Unemployment and Long-Term Unemployment: The Composition of 
the Unemployed and Long-Term Unemployed In Tough Labor Markets, 133 
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2010/10/art1full.pdf. 
9. See Most Important Problem, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1675/Most-Important-Problem.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2013). 
10. See Id. 
11. See Lydia Saad, U.S. Perceptions of Job Market Remain Weak but 
Improved, GALLUP (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155171/Perceptions-Job-Market-Remain-Weak-
Improved.aspx. 
12. See Lydia Saad, In U.S., Jobs a More Glaring Issue for Some Groups 
Than Others, GALLUP (June 27, 2012), 
3
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B. Rising Perception that Prospective Employers Discriminate  
 Against Unemployed Candidates 
 
In late May 2010, a staffing agency advertised a position 
with Sony Ericsson in Atlanta that stated, “Candidates MUST 
be currently working for an original consumer electronics 
manufacturer in marketing. NO EXCEPTIONS.”13 Shortly 
thereafter, the advertisement came to the attention of the 
Orlando Sentinel, which ran an article questioning the 
employer’s practice of excluding candidates based on their 
employment status.14 A spokesperson for Sony Ericsson quickly 
explained that there had been a miscommunication with the 
recruiter and that the language in the advertisement was a 
mistake.15 
A handful of articles discussing this practice quickly 
followed, although actual data remained anecdotal.16 For 
example, a New York Post columnist detailed the story of 
Andrea Altieri, an individual with years of work experience 
and a master’s degree, who was shocked to encounter a job 
posting in her area that required proof of “current W-2 
income.”17 The piece further observed that a search through a 
job-listing aggregator website showed that a number of job 
advertisements in the New York City area required applicants 
to be currently working for positions, such as sales 
 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/155375/Jobs-Glaring-Issue-Groups-
Others.aspx. 
13. Jim Stratton, You’re Out of Work? Don’t Apply for This Job, ORLANDO 
SENTINEL, June 3, 2010, at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 11354998. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See, e.g., Liz Wolgemuth, How to Get a Job After a Year (or More) 
Out of Work, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 10, 2010, 
http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/articles/2010/06/10/how-to-get-a-job-
after-a-year-or-more-out-of-work; Barbara Shelly, Unemployed Need Support 
from Congress, KAN. CITY STAR, July 12, 2010, 
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/opinion/shelly-unemployed-need-
support-from-congress/nRwGZ/. 
17. See Chris Erikson, The Scarlet U – Why Employers Favor Candidates 
with Jobs Over the Unemployed; A Stacked Deck, N.Y. POST, July 26, 2010, at 
35, available at 2010 WLNR 14857453. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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representative and bank office manager.18 Several job 
recruiters commented on the prevalence of this practice and 
bias.19 
Despite the instances of discrimination against the 
unemployed being only anecdotal, the reaction to the news has 
been strong. For example, an article on the topic published on 
the Huffington Post received over 3,000 comments.20 
Furthermore, an October 2010 article in the Atlanta Journal-
Constitution focused on people’s sense of outrage at the 
practice.21 A common refrain was that it should be illegal.22 
In June 2011, in a national survey conducted by Hart 
Research Associates, eighty percent of respondents described 
the refusal to consider unemployed job applicants as “very 
unfair.”23 Almost two-thirds of respondents said they favored a 
congressional proposal to make “it illegal for companies to 
refuse to hire or consider a qualified job applicant solely 
because the person is currently unemployed.”24 
With this backdrop, and as a presidential election 
approached,25 federal, state, and city officials have proposed 
 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. See Dan Chapman, Long-Term Jobless Told Not to Apply, ATLANTA 
J.—CONST., Oct. 4, 2010, at A1, available at 2010 WLNR 19654528. 
22. Id. 
23. National Employment Law Project, Hiring Discrimination Against 
the Unemployed: Federal Bill Outlaws Excluding the Unemployed From Job 
Opportunities, as Discriminatory Ads Persist (July 12, 2011), available at 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/b4ade339e970088d72_alm6blqx8.pdf. 
24. Id. 
25. See Chuck Leddy, A Nonpartisan Primer on Jobs and Politics, BOS. 
GLOBE, March 21, 2012, at G4, available at 2012 WLNR 5966618 (“In this 
election year, polls have consistently shown that one thing is clear in the 
minds of Americans: The most important issues are the economy and 
unemployment.”); Ewen MacAskill, Obama Turns Up Heat on Romney Over 
Corporate Past, GUARDIAN, July 13, 2012, at 26, available at 2012 WLNR 
14576455 (“The issue is significant because the Obama campaign claims that 
after 1999, Bain Capital, an investment vehicle, was involved in layoffs, 
bankruptcies and the outsourcing of American jobs to China, Mexico and 
elsewhere. The remarks are a potent charge in a tight election—Obama and 
Romney are neck-and-neck in the polls—in which unemployment is the main 
issue.”). 
5
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bills to address the perceived problem.26 
 
C. The Legislative Responses 
 
1. State and Local Responses 
 
State and local legislators have been quick to propose 
legislation to address the perceived problem of employers 
discriminating against unemployed candidates in hiring. New 
Jersey and Oregon passed bills that regulate job 
advertisements. The District of Columbia passed a broader bill 
that also prohibits employers from using employment status as 
a basis for hiring decisions. More than a dozen other states 
have considered or are considering legislation. The trend 
appears to show that expansive bills face a more difficult path 
than narrower ones. 
 
a. New Jersey 
 
On March 29, 2010, New Jersey passed a statute aimed at 
stopping employers from discriminating against the 
unemployed, enacting the legislation within six months of the 
bill’s introduction in the state assembly.27 The legislative 
process illustrates some of the competing considerations at 
play, including Governor Chris Christie voicing concerns about 
excess regulation and the legislature seeking to protect the 
unemployed. 
On October 7, 2010, Democrat Assemblyman Peter Barnes 
proposed a bill that would prohibit an employer or its agent 
from publishing job vacancies that prohibit or suggest that 
unemployed individuals should not apply for the advertised 
positions.28 Eleven days later, the state assembly passed the 
proposed bill by a 58-to-18 margin with two abstentions. 29 On 
 
26. See Parker & Saperstein, supra note 1. 
27. Assemb. B. 3359, 214th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2010), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3359_I1.PDF. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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November 8, 2010, the state senate received the proposed bill, 
which was in less than two weeks later by a vote of 29-to-6. 30 
The original proposal stated: 
1. No employer or employer’s agent, 
representative, or designee shall publish, in print 
or on the Internet, an advertisement for any job 
vacancy that contains one or more of the 
following: 
 
a. Any provision stating or suggesting 
that the qualifications for a job include 
current employment; 
 
b. Any provision stating or suggesting 
that the employer or employer’s agent, 
representative, or designee will not 
consider or review an application for 
employment submitted by any job 
applicant currently unemployed; or 
 
c. Any provision stating or suggesting that 
the employer or employer’s agent, 
representative, or designee will only 
consider or review applications for 
employment submitted by job applicants 
who are currently employed. 
 
2. Any employer who violates this act shall be 
subject to a civil penalty in an amount not to 
exceed $5,000 for the first violation and $10,000 
for each subsequent violation, collectible by the 
Commissioner of Labor and Workforce 
Development in a summary proceeding pursuant 
to the “Penalty Enforcement Law of 1999,” 
P.L.1999, c.274 (C.2A:58-10 et seq.). 
 
 
30. Id. 
7
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3. This act shall take effect immediately.31 
 
On January 6, 2011, Governor Christie returned the bill 
with several recommendations.32 Specifically, Christie voiced 
his concerns that the bill would harm the state’s business 
community by subjecting it to “significant fines, penalties and 
unwarranted litigation without requiring a finding of knowing 
and purposeful conduct on the part of the employer.”33 He 
further asserted that the term “suggesting” was too vague to 
provide employers with proper notice. 34 Christie also argued 
that the penalties were too strong and that the bill was unclear 
as to whether a private civil cause of action had been created. 35 
Finally, Christie noted that the “bill’s provisions likely conflict 
with existing civil service laws, rules and regulations and may 
subject appointing authorities to the penalties set forth in the 
legislation.”36 
In less than two months, the New Jersey state legislature 
addressed Christie’s concerns and passed the final bill, which 
provides: 
 
Unless otherwise permitted by the provisions of 
Title 11A of the New Jersey Statutes or any 
other law, rule or regulation, no employer or 
employer’s agent, representative, or designee 
shall knowingly or purposefully publish, in print 
or on the Internet, an advertisement for any job 
vacancy in this State that contains one or more of 
the following: 
 
a. Any provision stating that the 
 
31. Id. 
32. Veto Message from Chris Christie, Governor of N.J., to The Members 
of the N.J. General Assembly, at 1, available at   
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2010/Bills/A3500/3359_V1.PDF (last visited Apr. 
15, 2013). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 2. 
36. Id. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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qualifications for a job include current 
employment; 
 
b. Any provision stating that the employer 
or employer’s agent, representative, or 
designee will not consider or review an 
application for employment submitted by 
any job applicant currently unemployed; 
or 
 
c. Any provision stating that the employer 
or employer’s agent, representative, or 
designee will only consider or review 
applications for employment submitted by 
job applicants who are currently 
employed. 
 
Nothing set forth in this section shall be 
construed as prohibiting an employer or 
employer’s agent, representative, or designee 
from publishing, in print or on the Internet, an 
advertisement for any job vacancy in this State 
that contains any provision setting forth any 
other qualifications for a job, as permitted by 
law, including, but not limited to, the holding of 
a current and valid professional or occupational 
license, certificate, registration, permit or other 
credential, or a minimum level of education, 
training or professional, occupational or field 
experience. 
 
In addition, nothing set forth in this section shall 
be construed as prohibiting an employer or 
employer’s agent, representative, or designee 
from publishing, in print or on the Internet, an 
advertisement for any job vacancy that contains 
any provision stating that only applicants who 
9
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are currently employed by such employer will be 
considered.37 
 
The legislation included maximum civil penalties of $1,000 for 
the first violation, $5,000 for the second violation, and $10,000 
for each subsequent violation.38 The legislation explicitly 
disclaims that it creates a private right of action.39 
Ultimately, the final version of the legislation appears to 
have followed a middle path. The law prohibits employers from 
posting job advertisements that exclude currently unemployed 
candidates.40 However, it does not ban consideration of either 
past or present employment statuses in hiring decisions.41 Also, 
it subjects violators to civil fines. 42 These fines are graduated 
penalties, with the severity rising with recidivism.43 Finally, 
the passed legislation does not create a private right of action, 
leaving it to the state to enforce the provisions.44 
 
b. Washington, District of Columbia 
 
On March 19, 2012, the Mayor of the District of Columbia 
signed a proposed law making it unlawful for an employer to 
refuse to hire or consider for hire a candidate based on his or 
her employment status.45 This legislation also specifically 
prohibits employers from publishing an advertisement for a job 
opening that disqualifies candidates who are not presently 
 
37. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West 2011). 
38. Id. § 34:8B-2. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. § 34:8B-1. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. § 34:8B-2. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. D.C. CODE § 32-1361 (2012); see also Katharine H. Parker & Daniel 
L. Saperstein, Client Alert, Law Prohibiting Discrimination Based on 
Unemployment Status Signed by DC Mayor: Employers Beware – Similar 
Laws Likely to Follow, PROSKAUER (Mar. 28, 2012), 
http://www.proskauer.com/publications/client-alert/law-prohibiting-
discrimination-based-on-unemployment-status/. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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employed.46 The law further protects whistleblowers, 
prohibiting employers from restraining current employees’ 
exercise of rights conferred by the act or from retaliating 
against employees who take action under the act.47 Despite 
implementing broad protections for the unemployed, the law 
permits employers to (1) post job advertisements that require 
occupational or professional licenses or other similar 
qualifications, (2) consider the reasons underlying a candidate’s 
unemployment, and (3) publish job advertisements that state 
only the employer’s current employees will be considered.48 No 
private right of action is created.49 Instead, aggrieved 
individuals must file claims with the District of Columbia’s 
Office of Human Rights, which must investigate all claims and 
assess civil penalties against employers determined to have 
violated the act.50 The civil fines are as follows: $1,000 per 
claimant for an initial violation, $5,000 per claimant for a 
second violation, and $10,000 per claimant for each subsequent 
violation, not to exceed a total of $20,000 per violation.51 
Currently, the District of Columbia stands alone in 
prohibiting employers from considering a candidate’s 
employment status in the ultimate hiring decision. However, as 
noted below, the federal proposals are very similar. 
 
c. Oregon 
 
On March 27, 2012, Oregon Governor John Kitzhaber 
signed into law an act that prohibits discrimination against the 
unemployed in job listings.52 The Oregon law was passed 
within two months of its introduction in the state senate.53 The 
Oregon statute is similar to that of New Jersey’s in virtually all 
 
46. D.C. CODE § 32-1362(2). 
47. Id. § 32-1363. 
48. Id. § 32-1364. 
49. Id. § 32-1366(b). 
50. Id. § 32-1365. 
51. Id. § 32-1366(a). 
52. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 85.2 (West 2012); S. 1548, 76th Leg. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2012). 
53. See Or. S. 1548. 
11
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material respects, except that the Oregon statute caps the 
penalties at $1,000.54 This means that the Oregon statute only 
prohibits employers from the following: publishing job 
advertisements that indicate that currently unemployed 
candidates should not apply for the job, or stating that such 
individuals will not be considered for the position.55 However, 
the law does not bar the consideration of employment status in 
the ultimate hiring decision.56 Additionally, there is no private 
right of action.57 
 
d. California 
 
The California legislature passed Assembly Bill 1450 on 
August 30, 2012, enrolling the bill for Governor Jerry Brown’s 
approval on September 11, 2012.58 The version of the bill that 
passed both the state assembly and senate hews closely to the 
model of New Jersey and Oregon.59 The California legislation, 
however, has a few unique aspects to it. First, in addition to 
applying to employers and employment agencies, it also 
prohibits operators of internet web sites from publishing 
advertisements that exclude currently unemployed candidates, 
unless such advertisement is based on a bona fide occupational 
qualification or are restricted to current employees of the 
employer.60 Second, state contractors who violate the statute 
may have their contracts cancelled and may be barred from 
seeking other state contracts for up to three years.61 
The most interesting thing about the California legislation 
is that its scope was much broader when it was originally 
introduced in January 2012. First, it defined “status as 
 
54. § 85.2(4); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.855(1) (West 2011). 
55. § 85.2(1). 
56. § 85.2. 
57. § 85.2(3). 
58. Assembly Bill No. 1450, Version: 9/11/12 – Enrolled, CAL. 
LEGISLATIVE INFO., 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201120120
AB1450 (last visited April 1, 2013). 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
  
2013] NEITHER PANACEA, PLACEBO, NOR POISON 1019 
 
unemployed” as including an individual’s past 
unemployment.62 Second, in addition to the publication 
provisions that ultimately passed, the proposed legislation 
would have prohibited employers from refusing to consider 
candidates based on their status as unemployed and it would 
have made it unlawful for employment agencies to refuse to 
refer somebody on the same basis.63 Third, the proposed 
legislation included whistleblower protections.64 The California 
Senate cut these provisions through its amendments.65 The bill 
was then passed after its third reading.66 However, on 
September 30, 2012, Governor Brown returned the bill without 
his signature, stating without explanation that the changes 
could lead to unnecessary confusion.67 
 
e. Pending State Legislation 
 
In Arizona, House Bill 2660 was introduced on January 25, 
2012 but it has been held in committees since then.68 The 
proposed bill would treat long-term unemployment status 
(defined as twenty-seven or more continuous weeks of 
unemployment) like race, color, religion, sex, age, national 
origin, or disability, prohibiting employers and employment 
agencies from using long-term unemployment status as a basis 
for hiring and other employment decisions.69 Similar bills in 
Illinois70 and Maryland71 are pending in committees, while an 
 
62. See id. at Version: 01/05/12 - Introduced. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. See id. at Version: 8/22/12 – Amended Senate Introduced. 
66. See id. at  Version: 9/11/12 – Enrolled.. 
67. Veto Message from Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor of Cal., to The 
Members of the California State Assembly (Sept. 30, 2012), available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/docs/AB_1450_Veto_Message.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2013). 
68. See H.R. 2660, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2012); see also Bill 
Overview Status:HB2660, ARIZ. STATE LEGISLATURE,  
http://www.azleg.gov//FormatDocument.asp?inDoc=/legtext/50leg/2r/bills/hb2
660o.asp&Session_ID=107 (last visited Apr. 13, 2013). 
69. Ariz. H.R. 2660. 
70. See S. 2153, 97th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2011). 
71. See S. 966, 430th Gen. Assemb., (Md. 2012). 
13
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analogous proposal failed in the Wisconsin Senate.72 
In Connecticut, the general assembly introduced Bill No. 
5199, which would prohibit employers both from posting job 
advertisements that excluded unemployed candidates and from 
refusing to hire an individual based on their current and recent 
employment status, unless it was a bona fide occupational 
qualification.73 The bill appears to have failed.74 Similar 
proposals in New York and Pennsylvania are still pending 
while proposed bills in Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, 
South Dakota, and Tennessee have been stalled or killed in 
committees.75 
In New Hampshire, House Bill 350 was introduced on 
January 3, 2013 and is now in committee.76 This proposed bill 
 
72. See generally Senate Bill 249, WIS. LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENTS, 
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/proposals/reg/sen/bill/sb249 (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2013). 
73. H.R. 5199, Gen. Assemb., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2012), 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2012/TOB/h/pdf/2012HB-05199-R00-HB.pdf. 
74. See Discrimination Against the Unemployed, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/labor/discrimination-against-the-unemployed.aspx. 
75. See H.R. 815, 114th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2012), 
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=48051& 
(died in Bus. & Affairs Subcomm., Mar. 9, 2012); S. 205, 117th Gen. Assemb., 
2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012), 
http://www.in.gov/apps/lsa/session/billwatch/billinfo?year=2012&session=1&r
equest=getBill&docno=205 (in Comm., Jan. 4, 2012); S. 2028, Gen. Assemb. 
(Iowa  2012), http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/Cool-
ICE/default.asp?Category=BillInfo&Service=DspHistory&var=SF&key=0617
B&GA=84 (Subcomm. reassignment, Feb. 15, 2012); S. 1919, 87th Leg. 
(Minn. 2012), 
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=
Senate&f=SF1919&ssn=0&y=2012 (referring bill to Judiciary & Public 
Safety, Feb. 16, 2012); S. 00677, 236th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013), 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?term=2013&bn=S00677 (reintroducing bill, 
Jan. 9, 2013); H.R. 180, Gen. Assemb., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2013), 
http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/billinfo.cfm?syear=2013&sind=0&
body=H&type=B&bn=0180 (reintroducing prior H.R. 2157 of 2011/2012, Jan. 
22, 2013); S. 184, Leg. Assemb., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012), 
http://legis.state.sd.us/sessions/2012/QuickFind.aspx (deferring bill,  Feb. 10, 
2012); S. 3130, Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2012), 
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=HB3757&g
a=107 (deferring bill, Mar. 14, 2012). 
76. See H.R. 350, 163rd Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2013), 
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/bill_status/Bill_docket.aspx?lsr=466&sy=201
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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would prohibit employers and employment agencies from 
discriminating against unemployed individuals in hiring 
decisions and advertisements.77 Violations would result in a 
fine of no more than $5,000 for the first violation and $10,000 
for subsequent violations.78 However, unlike Connecticut’s 
proposed bill described in the paragraph above, New 
Hampshire’s proposed bill does not include an explicit 
exception for bona fide occupational qualifications.79 
In Colorado, House Bill 12-1134 was introduced on 
January 20, 2012.80 In substance, it is very similar to the 
legislation passed by New Jersey, calling for the same 
penalties, substantive scope, and absence of a private right of 
action.81 On February 21, 2012, the Colorado House Committee 
on Economic and Business Development recommended that the 
bill be postponed indefinitely.82 Similar legislation proposed in 
Michigan and Ohio is still pending.83 
 
f. Local Responses 
 
Even municipal legislators have dabbled in legislation 
designed to prevent employers from discriminating against 
unemployed candidates. Notably, as of May 1, 2012, a Chicago 
 
3&sortoption=billnumber&txtsessionyear=2013&txtbillnumber=hb350 
(introducing bill, Jan. 3, 2013). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. 
80. See H.R. 12-1134, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012), 
http://www.statebillinfo.com/bills/bills/12/1134_01.pdf (introducing bill, Jan. 
20, 2012). 
81. Id. 
82. Reference Report, COLO. COMM. ON EDUC., HOUSE COMM. OF 
REFERENCE REP., Feb. 27, 2012, available at 
http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics2012a/csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/5F41EDDF50393
15E87257981007E0034?Open&file=HB1135_C_001.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 
2012). 
83. See H.R. 4675, 96th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011), 
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/(S(sqjzm5uu34nscm45y2roco55))/mileg.aspx?pa
ge=GetObject&objectName=2011-HB-4675 (introducing bill, May 24, 2011); 
H.R. 424, 129th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2012), 
http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_424_I_Y.pdf 
(introducing bill, Jan. 24, 2012). 
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city ordinance prohibits employers from publishing job 
advertisements that discriminate against the currently 
unemployed.84 Also, on January 23, 2013, the City Council of 
New York City passed a bill that would make it unlawful for 
employers to base employment decisions on a candidate’s 
recent or current unemployment and to publish job 
advertisements that discriminate against the unemployed.85 
Mayor Bloomberg of New York has stated that he will veto the 
bill but the city council likely has enough votes to override the 
veto.86 
 
2. Federal Response 
 
a. Initial Response from Congress and EEOC 
 
In response to the early news stories of employers 
discriminating against unemployed candidates, in November 
2010, more than fifty members of Congress wrote to the 
chairperson of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), voicing their outrage and calling on the 
agency to investigate how the practice of excluding unemployed 
individuals from consideration for job opportunities might have 
an adverse impact on minority groups.87 The members of 
Congress further asserted that if employers discriminated 
against the unemployed, it would prolong the unemployment 
crisis.88 
On February 16, 2011, the EEOC met to examine the 
treatment of unemployed job seekers.89 The EEOC heard from 
eight panelists who came from the U.S. Department of Labor, 
 
84. CHI., ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 2-160-055 (2012). 
85. NYC Council Passes Bill Protecting Unemployed, THE LEADER, Jan. 
24, 2013, at 3A, available at 2013 WLNR 1859522. 
86. Id. 
87. Letter from Representative Hank Johnson, et al., to Jacqueline 
Berrien, Chair, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Nov. 17, 
2010), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/d46e3430d5e9cd7003_2tm6vw2oy.pdf. 
88. Id. 
89. Meeting of Feb. 16, 2011— EEOC to Examine Treatment of 
Unemployed Job Seekers, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-
11/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol33/iss3/4
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non-profit organizations, and private firms.90 The panelists 
discussed whether employers actually discriminated against 
the unemployed, the effect any such discrimination might have 
on different populations, and the issues associated with 
bringing Title VII disparate impact claims based on the 
practice. 91 
 
b. Congressional Legislative Proposals 
 
While the EEOC has not yet formally acted on its hearing, 
members of Congress have introduced several bills that would 
prohibit unemployment discrimination. 
On March 26, 2011, Representative Hank Johnson from 
Georgia introduced H.R. 1113, the Fair Employment Act of 
2011.92 This bill would amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-1, et seq.) by adding “unemployment status” to 
the list of covered characteristics.93 The bill remains in 
committee.94 
On September 21, 2011, Representative John Larson from 
Connecticut introduced the American Jobs Act of 2011.95 This 
bill included a section that would prohibit discrimination in 
employment on the basis of an individual’s employment status 
and is very similar to the legislation passed in the District of 
Columbia.96 The federal bill would prohibit employers from 
publishing job advertisements that excluded candidates who 
were currently unemployed and from refusing to hire or 
consider hiring an individual based on his or her current 
employment status.97 The bill also contained a whistleblower 
provision that would prevent employers from restraining 
 
90. Transcript of U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Meeting, available at  http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-16-
11/transcript.cfm [hereinafter Transcript of EEOC Meeting]. 
91. Id. 
92. Fair Employment Act of 2011, H.R. 1113, 112th Cong. (2011). 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. American Jobs Act of 2011, H.R. 12, 112th Cong. (2011). 
96. Id. 
97. Id. § 374(a)-(b). 
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individuals from exercising their rights under the act or from 
retaliating against individuals for exercising those rights.98 The 
proposed bill would not have precluded an employer or 
employment agency from considering an individual’s 
employment history.99 The bill provided for a private right of 
action.100 Remedies included injunctive relief, reimbursement 
of costs, liquidated damages of no more than $1,000 for each 
day of the violation, attorneys’ fees, and compensatory damages 
not to exceed $5,000.101 The bill failed in the Senate.102 Two 
other bills – S. 1549 and H.R. 3638 – set forth similar 
proposals.103 These bills remain in committee.104 
Additionally, on July 12, 2012, Representative Rosa 
DeLauro from Connecticut introduced H.R. 2501.105 Further, on 
August 2, 2011, Senator Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut 
introduced S. 1471.106 These proposals are very similar to the 
American Jobs Act provisions described above. The key 
difference is that H.R. 2501 and S. 1471 prohibit employers 
from discriminating against candidates based on the 
candidate’s history of unemployment as well as the candidate’s 
current employment status.107 The bills remain in committee.108 
 
 
 
98. Id. § 374(c). 
99. Id. § 374(d). 
100. Id. § 375(a)(6). 
101. Id. § 375(c). 
102. See Alan Silverleib, Obama Vows to Break Jobs Plan Into Separate 
Bills After Senate Setback, CNN (Oct. 12, 2011, 12:09 PM), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-10-11/politics/politics_jobs-bill_1_jobs-plan-gop-
leaders-senate-democrats?_s=PM:POLITICS; Daniel L. Saperstein, The 
Hiring Process Redefined: How Employers Should Prepare for the Prospect of 
“Unemployment Discrimination” Laws, 18 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL 
GUIDANCE 1, art. 3 (2012). 
103. Act for the 99%, H.R. 3638, 112th Cong. (2011); American Jobs Act 
of 2011, S. 1549, 112th Cong. (2011). 
104. H.R. 3638; S.1549. 
105. Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2011, H.R. 2501, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
106. Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 2011, S. 1471, 112th Cong. 
(2011). 
107. See H.R. 2501; S. 1471. 
108. H.R. 2501; S. 1471. 
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III. Discussion 
 
A. Solutions in Search of a Problem? 
 
One of the most curious aspects of the flurry of legislative 
activity detailed above is that it appears to be based on very 
little evidence that discrimination against the unemployed is 
actually a widespread practice. A dozen or so articles detailed a 
handful of cases and included reports of recruiters 
acknowledging the existence of the practice even when not 
explicitly stated.109 And, as seen in the legislative records, 
these stories generally have formed the basis for the proposed 
legislation.110 
But only one survey has been conducted and publicized. In 
2011, the National Employment Law Project (NELP) found 
more than 150 job postings on employment web sites such as 
Indeed.com, CareerBuilder.com, and Monster.com requiring 
that applicants “must be currently employed” or using other 
exclusionary language based on current employment status.111 
Michael Saltsman, a research fellow at the Employment 
Policies Institute, took issue with the NELP report.112 
Saltsman observed that one of the websites examined by NELP 
estimated that there were three million job posts available 
online when NELP searched its site.113 This means that the 
incidence rate of job postings that discriminated against the 
 
109. See Jobs Hiring Bias Hurts Seekers' Chances Those Who are 
Unemployed for Lengthy Time See Discrimination, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 26, 
2012, at B6; The Long-Jobless See Hiring Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar, 24, 2012, at 
4; Stephen Singer, No Jobs? That May Keep You from Getting One, ST. PAUL 
PIONEER PRESS, Mar. 24, 2012, at A13, available at 2012 WLNR 6459742; 
Mary Helen Miller, Help Wanted. But Only if You Have a Job, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 17839308. 
110. See, e.g., Letter from Representative Hank Johnson, et al., to 
Jacqueline Berrien, supra note 87; Paul Moriarty, The Unemployed: ‘Elitist’ 
Republican Stands in the Way, DAILY REC., Nov. 7, 2010, available at 2010 
WLNR 22252689. 
111. Sam Hananel, Jobless Seek Protection Against Bias, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Oct. 10, 2011, at 37. 
112. See Michael Saltsman, Are the Unemployed Victims of 
Discrimination?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2011, at A15. 
113. Id. 
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unemployed was less than 0.005% of one month’s job 
postings.114 Saltsman further contended that the NELP report 
took words out of context, citing an example in which the 
phrase “currently employed” appeared but did not indicate that 
the unemployed were unwelcome to apply.115 Saltsman 
concluded that, given the lack of hard data as to whether 
employers are discriminating against the unemployed, the 
legislative activity is misguided, as it would create a new 
liability for employers while doing little to lower the 
unemployment rate.116 
It is also possible that employers are reducing their use of 
employment status in hiring given the public’s response to the 
practice. For example, as noted above, Sony Erickson—whose 
2010 advertisement kicked off the public debate—quickly 
disclaimed any responsibility for the inclusion of the current-
employment requirement in the posting.117 Additionally, in 
September 2011, the job listing website Indeed.com said that it 
would stop posting advertisements that exclude applications 
from unemployed candidates.118 Accordingly, there are several 
data points that suggest employers might be moving away from 
excluding unemployed candidates even absent legislation. 
As exemplified by the testimony of the various panelists at 
the EEOC hearing to examine the practice of excluding 
currently unemployed people from an applicant pool, there are 
other general trends and perspectives that might color whether 
one believes that unemployment discrimination is widespread. 
At the EEOC hearing, William E. Spriggs, Assistant Secretary 
for Policy, U.S. Department of Labor, was the first to testify.119 
He noted that there were approximately nine unemployed job 
seekers for every two available positions and that, given the 
surplus in labor supply, “employers, of course, are going to very 
 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Stratton, supra note 13, at B1. 
118. Job Website Will Refuse Ads that Reject Unemployed, TAMPA BAY 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at 4B. 
119. Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90. 
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likely up the ante on job applicants.”120 He specifically 
referenced the possibility that employers might require 
applicants to be currently employed or only very recently 
unemployed and observed that it is hard to quantify the 
prevalence of the practice because it might not be done 
openly.121 Christine Owens, Executive Director of the National 
Employment Law Project (NELP), echoed these views, 
describing anecdotal reports of the discriminatory practices 
and the disparate impact it has had on older workers, women, 
and minorities.122 On the other hand, Fernan R. Cepero, Vice 
President for Human Resources of The YMCA of Greater 
Rochester, representing the Society for Human Resource 
Management, discussed the costs involved in hiring, explaining 
that the key issue for employers is getting the right employee 
as opposed to privileging an artificial marker such as current 
employment status.123 He further stated that his organization 
is unaware of any trend in excluding the unemployed from 
consideration for jobs.124 James S. Urban, a partner at Jones 
Day, seconded Cepero’s remarks and described looking through 
“help wanted” sections of major newspapers and not turning up 
any advertisements that excluded the unemployed.125 
Although there is a paucity of data supporting the notion 
that discrimination against the unemployed is a widespread 
practice, as discussed further below, the legislative activity 
might have some beneficial economic effects and expresses 
social values. The legislative activity will likely aid members of 
constitutionally-protected classes who are unemployed and 
disproportionately impacted by the practice, and will not result 
in the parade of horribles described by employer-friendly 
industry groups. 
 
 
 
 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
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B. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Legislation as a Means 
 of Reducing Unemployment or Otherwise Improving the 
 Economy 
 
The public rhetoric in support of the anti-unemployment 
discrimination legislation often includes strong words about 
how discrimination against the unemployed prolongs 
joblessness and hurts the economy. For example, at a press 
conference promoting the proposed Fair Employment 
Opportunity Act in September 2011, Senator Sherrod Brown 
said: “The best way to get our economy back on track is also the 
best way to reduce our deficit: putting people back to work. 
There are millions of Americans who would rather be paying 
taxes than collecting unemployment insurance.”126 In an article 
attacking opponents of New Jersey’s anti-unemployment 
discrimination legislation, a New Jersey assemblyman stated: 
“It is also now apparent that when our state’s Republican 
leaders talk about creating jobs for New Jersey residents, those 
jobs aren’t necessarily for the jobless.”127 A state senator, 
supporting the passage of the Oregon bill, asserted: “It’s crazy 
to say that you have to have work, to look for work. If you had 
work, you wouldn’t need work, so you wouldn’t have to look for 
work. We’re just trying to make it clear that people who don’t 
have work can look for work.”128 
While this rhetoric speaks to a sense of injustice and lack 
of fairness, it does not actually explain the mechanics of how 
the bills might reduce unemployment. Illustrating this gap, the 
California Assembly’s Committee on Judiciary issued a report 
in which it asked whether employers’ policies discriminating 
 
126. Press Release, Sherrod Brown, Senator for Ohio, Unemployed 
Ohioans Need Not Apply: Brown Calls for Swift Passage of Bill Outlawing 
Discrimination Against Jobless Americans (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/brown-joins-
unemployed-worker-in-columbus-to-call-for-swift-passage-of-bill-outlawing-
discrimination-against-the-unemployed. 
127. Moriarty, supra note 110. 
128. Janie Har, Employers Could Not Discriminate Against the 
Unemployed Under Bill: 2012 Oregon Legislature, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, 
Feb. 22, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 3875033. 
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against the unemployed exacerbate the unemployment crisis.129 
The supporters of the bill argued that such policies “reflect 
insensitivity to today’s sever job deficit” and that “the lack of 
available job openings and the denial of employment 
opportunities that do exist create stark obstacles for more than 
14 million unemployed who simply want to get back to 
work.”130 The problem with this statement is that addressing 
putative barriers for unemployed candidates does not clearly 
mitigate the issue of overwhelming job scarcity, which 
presumably drives the high unemployment rates and the 
negative economic effects of high unemployment. 
To this point, writing in opposition to California’s anti-
unemployment discrimination bill, a coalition of employer 
groups lead by the California Chamber of Commerce explained, 
“Finally, this bill will not affect the unemployment rate. If 
there is an available position, the employer will ultimately hire 
someone.”131 Additionally, as an Oregon representative 
observed, “There’s nothing I can perceive in this piece of 
legislation that would create one more job in the private 
sector.”132 
As the opponents of the anti-unemployment discrimination 
bills argue, the salutary effect of the bills probably will not be a 
reduction in aggregate unemployment. Even if we assume that 
most employers have a preference for hiring currently 
employed individuals, in the aggregate, employer-demand for a 
new full-time employee presumably ultimately results in the 
hiring of a currently unemployed individual. When an 
employer excludes the currently unemployed from its applicant 
pool, it does so in the belief that it can entice a currently 
employed individual to leave his or her job for the new position. 
If this belief is correct, the new hire’s old position presumably 
 
129. See Bill Analysis: Discrimination on the Basis of Unemployment, 
CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON JUDICIARY, COMM., Apr. 17, 2012, 
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_1401-
1450/ab_1450_cfa_20120416_105620_asm_comm.html. 
130. Id. at 5. 
131. Id. at 9. 
132. Editorial, Employment Discrimination Always Wrong, WALLA 
WALLA UNION-BULL., Feb. 29, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 4410359. 
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is now open and must be filled. Eventually, some employer will 
have to either opt to let its position remain vacant and suffer 
the associated economic costs or hire a currently unemployed 
individual. In other words, it is job creation that reduces 
unemployment and the anti-unemployment discrimination bills 
do not obviously encourage job creation.133 To the contrary, it is 
possible that some employers might actually forgo seeking to 
fill positions based on liability concerns related to the anti-
unemployment discrimination legislation.134 
On the other hand, the anti-unemployment discrimination 
legislation probably has economic benefits other than reducing 
unemployment in the aggregate. First, it is widely 
acknowledged that arbitrary discrimination negatively impacts 
the economy. As a senator stated when discussing Title VII, 
“There is considerable evidence to demonstrate that permitting 
people to be hired on the basis of their qualifications not only 
helps business, but also improves the total national 
economy.”135 Amongst other harms, discriminatory exclusions 
in hiring can alienate clients and artificially limit applicant 
pools.136 
Second, although the anti-unemployment discrimination 
legislation is unlikely to reduce the aggregate amount of 
unemployment, it might lead to an economically healthier 
distribution and pattern of unemployment. By reducing 
barriers for unemployed candidates, the anti-unemployment 
 
133. See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, The Supreme Court 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 37 (1976) (arguing that there is a cost to innocent individuals in the 
employment context that results from remedying racial discrimination 
because even the usual specific remedy—an order requiring the employer to 
accord an identifiable individual priority for the next vacancy—adversely 
affects another applicant for the vacancy who would otherwise have gotten 
the job). 
134. See, e.g., Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Sorting, Quotas, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Who Hires When It's Hard To Fire?, 45 J.L. & ECON. 41, 
43 (2002) (noting that higher expected costs of litigation by protected workers 
might work to reduce the number of protected workers employed). 
135. 110 CONG. REC. 13,088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). 
136. See Vivek Wadhwa, The True Cost of Discrimination, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (June 5, 2006), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2006-06-
05/the-true-cost-of-discrimination; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE 
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 351-52 (1981). 
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discrimination legislation might encourage greater job 
movement amongst currently employed individuals, 
encouraging those who are dissatisfied with their jobs to quit 
because they will be more optimistic about finding another 
position.137 And, with more positions in play and no exclusions 
for unemployed candidates, there might be less stasis amongst 
the long-term unemployed. The economy would likely benefit 
from this lessened degree of stasis, because long-term 
unemployment carries unique problems that are more severe 
than those associated with brief periods of unemployment. For 
example, after a long time out of the workforce, workers’ skills 
might decay.138 This is particularly true for positions in which 
there are rapid changes in technology.139 Additionally, long-
term unemployment can damage a family’s finances as savings 
are depleted.140 This, in turn, might place a greater burden on 
government programs such as Medicaid.141 It also might hurt 
the economy as a whole because the decline in consumer 
spending might impede growth.142 Workers’ morale might 
 
137. Robert E. Hall, Turnover in the Labor Force, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECON. ACTIVITY 709, 712 (1972), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Projects/BPEA/1972%203/1972c_bpea_hall
_gordon_holt.PDF (“[Workers’] decisions to quit will depend on the amount of 
the loss involved and the cost of finding new work. Everything else held 
constant, slack markets should discourage quits.”); Paula G. Ardelean et al., 
The Development of Employment Rights and Responsibilities from 1985 to 
2010, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 449, 457 (2010) (“As fewer positions are 
available, employers become less willing to take chances in hiring, and 
employees become less willing to risk losing a secure position.”). 
138. In the Bleak Midwinter: Poverty Looms for the Long-Term 
Unemployed, ECONOMIST (Dec. 16, 2010), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/17733387?subjectid=348876&story_id=17733
387 [hereinafter In the Bleak Midwinter]; Megan Felter, Short-Time 
Compensation: Is Germany’s Success with Kurzarbeit an Answer to U.S. 
Unemployment?, 35 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 481, 493-94 (2012) (detailing 
benefits of avoiding long-term unemployment for employers, employees, and 
government). 
139. Katherine Yung, Long-Term Unemployed Face Spiral Downward, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Sept. 4, 2011, at A1, available at 2011 WLNR 17502459. 
140. Id. 
141. Id.; see also In the Bleak Midwinter, supra note 138. 
142. Patrik Jonsson, Why Have Millions of Americans Given Up Looking 
for Work?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 8, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 
19157620. 
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suffer too, leading to fewer motivated job seekers and a rise in 
health and emotional problems.143 
Although long-term unemployment is not singled out as 
the target of the legislation, these sentiments have been 
captured in the legislative records of several proposed anti-
unemployment discrimination bills.144 For example, the most 
recently introduced federal bill states that discrimination 
against the unemployed burdens commerce by: 
 
(1) reducing personal consumption and 
undermining economic stability and growth; 
(2) squandering human capital essential to the 
Nation’s economic vibrancy and growth; 
(3) increasing demands for Federal and State 
unemployment insurance benefits, reducing trust 
fund assets, and leading to higher payroll taxes 
for employers, cuts in benefits for jobless 
workers, or both; 
(4) imposing additional burdens on publicly 
funded health and welfare programs; and 
(5) depressing income, property, and other tax 
revenues that the Federal Government, States, 
and localities rely on to support operations and 
institutions essential to commerce.145 
 
Despite the general thrust of public rhetoric in support of 
the anti-unemployment discrimination bill, they are unlikely to 
reduce unemployment in the aggregate but they might change 
the demographics of the unemployed in a manner that benefits 
the economy. 
 
C. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Bills as an Expression  
 of Social Values 
 
143. Id.; Tara Siegel Bernard, When 'for Richer, for Poorer' is Put to the 
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2012 at B1; Yung, supra note 139, at A1. 
144. See S. 1471, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2028, 84th Gen. Assemb. Sess. 
(Iowa 2012); S. 3130, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2012). 
145. S. 1471. 
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Laws communicate a society’s values.146 People may 
support a law because they “believe that [the law] is 
intrinsically valuable for the relevant ‘statement’ to be made” 
and not because of the law’s ability to control behavior.”147 
Given the unclear economic benefit of anti-unemployment 
discrimination bills, it is easiest to characterize them as 
expressions of social values. 
First, the bills express society’s understanding of fairness. 
As noted above, in June 2011, in a national survey conducted 
by Hart Research Associates, eighty percent of respondents 
described employers’ refusal to consider unemployed job 
applicants as “very unfair.”148 Indeed, the public rhetoric 
surrounding the bills mirrors this. For example, Senator Brown 
promoted the proposed Fair Employment Opportunity Act of 
2012 by stating, “Americans who work hard and play by the 
rules— but lose a job through no fault of their own—deserve a 
fair chance at the next one.”149 And, as Helen Norton, a 
professor at the University of Colorado Law School, testified 
before the EEOC, current employment is likely a weak proxy 
for former professional success or relevant experience.150 
Second, the bills express a sense of care for the sensibilities 
of the unemployed. For example, following the initial passage 
of the New Jersey bill in the state assembly, Democrat 
Assemblyman Paul Moriarty wrote a piece that unfavorably 
compared Assemblyman Jay Webber, one of New Jersey’s 
highest-ranking Republicans, unfavorably to “heartless elitists” 
after Webber voted against the bill.151 Moriarty explained that 
employers who run job advertisements that exclude 
unemployed candidates “make unemployed people feel like 
 
146. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2021, 2022 (1996). 
147. Id. at 2026. 
148. Briefing Paper, Hiring Discrimination Against the Unemployed: 
Federal Bill Outlaws Excluding the Unemployed from Job Opportunities, as 
Discriminatory Ads Persist, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT 3 (July 12, 
2011), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/b4ade339e970088d72_alm6blqx8.pdf. 
149. CONG. DOCS. (Sept. 21, 2011), available at 2011 WLNR 18890284. 
150. Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90. 
151. See Moriarty, supra note 110. 
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lepers, outcasts and losers.”152 and communicated that, “You’re 
damaged goods, you don’t merit consideration, jobs are not for 
the jobless, just for those already employed!”153 He argued that 
preventing this message was more important than protecting 
businesses from additional regulation. 
 
D. Anti-Unemployment Discrimination Bills as Protection for  
 Members of Constitutionally-Protected Classes 
 
Employment status, in and of itself, is not immutable and, 
therefore, does not fit comfortably within the set of existing 
constitutionally-protected classes.154 This might explain why 
the legislative attempts to turn employment status into a 
protected class have been less successful than enacting 
narrower anti-unemployment discrimination bills.155 But the 
concern that discrimination against unemployed candidates 
might disproportionately impact minorities, seniors, women, 
and the disabled appears to have driven the initial federal 
activity. For example, the November 2010 letter from more 
than fifty member of Congress to the chairperson of the EEOC 
explicitly identified the worry that excluding unemployed 
individuals from consideration for job opportunities might have 
an adverse impact on minority groups.156 As such, the 
panelists’ discussions at the February 2011 EEOC meeting 
 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. See Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health 
Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks 
and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 320 (2010) (“A key difference between anti-
discrimination laws and common law doctrine is that the former creates 
protected classes defined primarily (although not exclusively—religion is an 
exception) on immutable traits of the employee, like race, age, and genetics, 
while common law doctrine focuses on the employer's reasons or the 
employee's actions, without regard to such inherent traits.”). 
155. Compare N. J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West 2011) (New Jersey 
statute regarding restrictions upon the use of employment status as a 
qualification for job vacancies), with H.R. 2660, 50th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2012) (Arizona employment discrimination bill). 
156. See Letter from Representative Hank Johnson, et al., to Jacqueline 
Berrien, supra note 87, at 1. 
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focused on this issue.157 
At the EEOC hearing, Assistant Secretary Spriggs 
observed that African Americans, Latinos, and workers with 
disabilities were overrepresented in the unemployment pool.158 
He further explained that older workers make up a 
disproportionate share of the long-term unemployed.159 He 
concluded “there is the strong indication that there’s the 
potential for disparate impacts among racial minorities, among 
workers with disabilities, and among older workers.”160 
Christine Owens, Executive Director of NELP, also described 
anecdotal reports of the discriminatory practices and the 
disparate impact they likely have had on older workers, 
women, and minorities.161 Fatima Goss Graves, Vice President 
for Education and Employment at the National Women’s Law 
Center, testified that the practice would likely have a disparate 
impact on women, noting that women have lost ground to men 
in employment rates during the recession and that women are 
more likely to be long-term unemployed.162 Algernon Austin, 
Director of the Race, Ethnicity, and the Economy Program at 
the Economic Policy Institute, asserted that the practice would 
have a disparate impact on racial minorities, focusing on their 
current and historical high rates of unemployment, when 
compared to whites.163 Joyce Bender, CEO of Bender 
Consulting Services, likewise discussed why the practice would 
have a disparate impact on the disabled, explaining that many 
individuals become disabled after an accident that leaves them 
without a current job. 164 The testimony of Assistant Secretary 
Spriggs, and the rest of the speakers, is consistent with the 
data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is 
described above. 
On the other hand, Mr. Urban, a partner at Jones Day, 
 
157. See Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
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argued that the numbers from the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistic did not meet the EEOC’s threshold for showing a 
disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic job 
seekers.165 But Professor Norton countered that the 
demographic data offered by the other witnesses suggested 
that a current-employment requirement had the potential to 
impose an adverse impact in a number of contexts.166 She noted 
that the particular market and job would play a role in 
determining whether the allegedly discriminatory policy had a 
disparate impact.167 Also, Mr. Urban’s comments only go to 
whether a complainant would be able to allege a prima facie 
Title VII disparate impact claim; not whether members of 
constitutionally-protected classes are, as a matter of fact, 
disproportionately vulnerable to current-employment hiring 
policies. 
Regardless as to whether Mr. Urban or Professor Norton is 
right about whether a member of a racial minority group could 
demonstrate that a particular practice has a legally cognizable 
disparate impact, the anti-unemployment discrimination bills 
have value precisely because a Title VII challenge to a current-
employment requirement would be difficult. More generally, 
the anti-unemployment discrimination bills arguably are 
necessary preventative measures to cover gaps or weak spots in 
existing anti-discrimination statutes. 
The prophylactic value of the bills is even more pronounced 
when considering the effect of a current-employment 
requirement on older individuals. Actions, otherwise prohibited 
by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act168 (“ADEA”), are 
not unlawful if the differentiation made by the employer “is 
based on reasonable factors other than age.”169 This is a 
defense unique to the ADEA, making liability under an ADEA 
adverse impact theory narrower than under Title VII, and 
mixed-motives are permissible in the ADEA context.170 In 
 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012). 
169. Id. § 623 (f)(1). 
170. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177-78 (2009); 
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effect, the broader anti-unemployment discrimination bills 
(such as that passed by the District of Columbia) remove 
employment status from the set of reasonable factors that 
would otherwise permit an employer to differentiate between 
younger and older candidates. (Whether employment status 
ever is a bona fide qualification or a proxy for legitimate 
qualifications is discussed further in the next section.) 
 
E. Business Community’s Concerns About Legislation Are 
 Likely Overstated 
 
In opposition to the anti-unemployment discrimination 
bills, the business community has marshaled several 
arguments, which focus on the potential harms. In particular, 
pro-employer commentators have questioned whether the bills 
will (1) open the floodgate of potentially frivolous litigation and 
(2) reduce employers’ ability to properly vet applicants.171 
These concerns appear overstated given the generally limited 
scope of the legislation, the lack of a private right of action, and 
legally approved uses of employment status and history. 
 
1. Concern that Legislation Will Open Floodgate of 
Litigation 
 
The pro-employer faction, typified by the large law firms 
that do labor law defense work, has suggested whether the 
anti-unemployment discrimination bills will lead to a 
significant increase in litigation. For example, an associate at 
Proskauer Rose contends that the definition of unemployment 
status in some proposals is so broad that it could apply to just 
about any query regarding the candidate’s work history.172 He 
also notes that some of the proposals allow for a private right of 
action with regard to the restrictions on including exclusionary 
 
Smith v. City of Jackson, Inc., 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
171. See Saperstein, supra note 102; Cal. Senate Rules Committee, 
Office of Senate Floor Analyses, Aug. 22, 2012; Lawrence R. Sandak & Daniel 
L. Saperstein, Is N.J. Going Too Far to Protect Jobless?, STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 
30, 2012, at 5, available at 2012 WLNR 9079300. 
172. See Saperstein, supra note 102. 
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language in job advertisements.173 He argues that, under these 
proposals, it is possible for any currently unemployed 
individual to identify a non-complying job posting, inquire 
about the position, and, if refused employment, file a lawsuit.174 
He further asserts that such proposals unduly encourage 
litigation.175 He also raises the specter of negligent-hiring 
claims, reasoning that, for fear of liability and costs, human 
resources personnel might not as vigorously question a 
candidate’s past work experience or follow-up on the contents 
of a resume’s work history and this might lead to employers 
hiring poor applicants.176 
The floodgate concern appears overstated. First, the 
District of Columbia appears to be the exception that proves 
the rule in terms of the scope of the anti-unemployment 
discrimination legislation. Besides the District of Columbia, the 
states that have enacted anti-unemployment discrimination 
legislation have all restricted the statutes to regulating job 
advertisements.177 And, as is illustrated by the discussion of 
California’s legislative history in particular and the current 
status of the pending bills in general, it is unlikely that the 
broader bills will pass.178 
Second, the passed statutes prohibit a practice that could 
serve as a predicate for a Title VII disparate impact claim.179 
The easy-to-follow bright line rule might actually reduce 
litigation given that an employer that uses candidates’ 
employment status in hiring decisions might violate existing 
federal law if it has the effect of discriminating against a 
constitutionally-protected class under a disparate impact 
theory. With that said, even if an employer complies with the 
job advertisement restrictions of the New Jersey and Oregon 
 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Compare D.C. CODE § 32-1362, with OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2 (West 
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1 (West 2011);  OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.855 
(West 2011). 
178. See supra notes 56-94 and accompanying text. 
179. D.C. CODE § 32-1362; OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-
1; OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.855. 
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statutes, they might still be liable under Title VII.180 But, to 
the extent that a viable disparate impact claim was present, 
the new laws do not change that. 
Third, state legislatures and agencies have examined the 
problem and their findings generally do not suggest that the 
anti-unemployment discrimination legislation would lead to a 
significant increase in litigation. For example, the California 
Assembly Committee on Appropriations estimated that there 
might be several thousand cases a year but, for fiscal purposes, 
the California Senate Appropriations Committee suggested 
that only about 250 cases would be filed for investigation and 
determination by the administrative agency tasked with 
handling employment discrimination claims.181 The District of 
Columbia estimated that there would be about 150 new cases a 
year.182 
Fourth, the majority of bills—and all three of the enacted 
statutes—do not permit a private right of action.183 Thus, 
focusing on the potential for spurious suits by individuals is an 
attack against a straw man. 
Fifth, as discussed below, employers may still take into 
account employment status where it is appropriate or 
necessary as a bona fide qualification.184 Companies, therefore, 
should not be constrained from making diligent inquiries into 
their candidates’ histories. And this implies that there should 
be little additional negligent-hiring liability exposure. 
 
 
 
 
 
180. New State Law Further Regulates Hiring, FISHER & PHILIPS LLP 
(Mar. 29, 2012), http://www.laborlawyers.com/15041. 
181. See REPORT OF THE CAL. ASSEMB. COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS (Apr. 
25, 2012); CAL. SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMM. FISCAL SUMMARY (Aug. 16, 
2012). 
182. Letter from Natwar M. Gandhi, Chief Fin. Officer, Washington, 
D.C., to the Hon. Kwame R. Brown, Chairman, Council of D.C. (Jan. 25, 
2012). 
183. See supra notes 25-94 and accompanying text. 
184. D.C. CODE § 32-1362; OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-
1; OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.855. 
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2. Concern that Legislation Will Prevent Proper Vetting 
of Candidates 
 
The pro-employer faction also has argued that the anti-
unemployment discrimination laws will alter how employers 
approach the hiring process, limiting what employers will ask 
about candidates’ work histories.185 For example, in its 
opposition to the California bill, the California Chamber of 
Commerce explained that the bill 
 
would place employers in the impossible 
situation of either: (1) investigating an 
applicant’s most recent employment, including 
the reasons for the separation of his/her 
employment with the employer and potentially 
face an administrative claim or litigation for the 
alleged violation of AB 1450 if the applicant is 
ultimately not hired; or (2) forego any 
investigation into the most recent employment of 
the applicant to prevent a claim that he/she was 
discriminated against on the basis of the 
applicant’s “unemployed status,” and risk a 
potential negligent hiring claim on the backend 
for hiring an at-risk employee that the employer 
knew or should have known was a potential 
danger.186 
 
Likewise, Proskauer Rose has asserted that employers 
might raise suspicions by concentrating on gaps in a 
candidate’s work history and, therefore, “commonplace 
interview or application questions concerning unaccounted-for 
time on a resume may become scarce.” 187 
 
185. See Katharine H. Parker & Daniel L. Saperstein, The Tide Turns 
Against Background Checks: How Employers Should Approach the Screening 
of Applicants and Employees, 18 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE 4 
(2010); CAL. SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES 
(Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES]. 
186. SENATE FLOOR ANALYSES, supra note 185. 
187. Parker & Saperstein, supra note 185. 
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These arguments do not apply to the New Jersey and 
Oregon legislation because these statutes do not prohibit an 
employer from using employment history as part of the hiring 
criteria.188 But even as to the District of Columbia anti-
unemployment discrimination law, the strength of these 
arguments is questionable because it explicitly permits an 
employer to examine the reasons underlying an individual’s 
status as unemployed in assessing an individual’s ability to 
perform a job or in otherwise making employment decisions 
about that individual.189 The bona fide occupational 
qualification exception is well established, as it also appears in 
the Title VII and ADEA statutes.190 
Furthermore, it is not obvious that there is a strong link 
between an individual’s employment status and his or her 
abilities. At the EEOC hearing, Professor Norton explained 
that current employment status probably is a poor proxy for 
quality job performance given that one might be unemployed 
for reasons unrelated to one’s skills.191 Specifically, Professor 
Norton notes that one might have been in school or a training 
program, had to leave a job because of spousal relocation, lost a 
job because of lack of seniority during employer downsizing or 
because the employer eliminated an entire division or shut 
down altogether, or left employment temporarily due to illness, 
injury, disability, pregnancy, or family care-giving 
responsibilities.192 Professor Norton also stated that current 
employment is a poor proxy for relevant experience because the 
candidate might have been unemployed because he or she has 
been in school receiving training.193 
Putting aside the efficacy issues of using employment 
status in hiring decisions, courts do have some experience 
grappling with the use of unemployment status as a proxy for 
characteristics that are not constitutionally-protected in the 
 
188. OR. LAWS ch. 85, § 2; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:8B-1; OR. REV. STAT. § 
659A.855. 
189. D.C. CODE § 32-1364(b). 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(f); 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (West 2008). 
191. See Transcript of EEOC Meeting, supra note 90. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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context of Batson challenges. Some courts have focused on the 
link between unemployment status and susceptibility to other 
forms of discrimination.194 But other courts have approached 
the use of an individual’s lack of current employment as being 
a legitimate proxy for analytic ability, responsibility, and 
having ties to the community.195 Accordingly, to the extent that 
a candidate’s employment history raised questions about these 
factors, it is likely that a potential employer would be able to 
ask about the candidate’s employment history without fear of 
liability under the anti-unemployment discrimination statutes. 
 
F. The Rise of Anti-Unemployment Discrimination  
 Legislation and Interest Convergence 
 
The anti-unemployment discrimination bills appear to be 
part of a trend of legislation and regulation that prohibits 
employers from using criteria that disproportionately impact 
vulnerable individuals without being clearly tied to legitimate 
qualifications. For example, the EEOC has issued guidance 
that sets forth its view that the use of criminal history in hiring 
decisions might have a disparate impact on candidates who are 
members of racial minority groups, particularly black and 
 
194. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Mississippi, 811 So. 2d 471, 476-77 (Miss. 
Ct. App. 2002) (Irving, J., concurring) (“Clearly denying unemployed persons 
a right to serve on the jury in Mississippi operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of African Americans since, as already observed, more African 
Americans, percentage wise, are unemployed than European Americans.”); 
Bowie v. Mississippi, 816 So. 2d 425, 430 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (Irving, J., 
concurring) (“I continue to believe that excluding a juror from jury service 
because he is unemployed is discrimination based on economic status.”); Ford 
Motor Credit Co. v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting Brown v. Superior Court, 691 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1984) (“Victims of 
employment discrimination are frequently unemployed—many times as the 
result of the alleged discrimination.”). 
195. See United States v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming 
dismissal of African American juror based on unemployment status because 
it evinced a lack of stake in the community); United States v. Brown, No. 
8:03CR289, 2009 WL 962246, at *3 (D. Neb. Apr. 7, 2009) (affirming 
dismissal of juror based on unemployment status);  People v. Hecker, 942 
N.E.2d 248 (N.Y. 2010) (noting approval of dismissal of juror for lack of 
employment history because it demonstrated a lack of “decision-making 
responsibilities”). 
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Latino men.196 In the same vein, New York prohibits employers 
from discriminating against candidates with criminal 
convictions unless there is a direct relationship between the 
previous offense and the position or if hiring the applicant 
would create an unreasonable risk to property or to the safety 
of the general public.197 Additionally, the use of credit checks in 
employment decisions has received increased scrutiny. Again, 
the EEOC has questioned whether the use of credit checks 
might have an adverse impact on female and minority 
candidates.198 And the federal government and several states 
have limited how employers may use credit checks in hiring.199 
To the extent that the primary effect of the anti-
unemployment discrimination legislation might be to protect 
vulnerable members of constitutionally protected groups from 
discrimination, the theory of interest convergence might 
explain its rise. In general, with regard to employment 
discrimination, the interest convergence theory suggests that 
states protect minorities only when doing so also promotes the 
interests of the majority.200 Recall that thirty-two percent of the 
 
196. Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment 
Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT GUIDE (Apr. 25, 2012), 
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf. 
197. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2007). 
198. See Pre-Employment Inquiries and Credit Rating or Economic 
Status, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_credit.cfm (last visited Apr. 23, 
2013). 
199. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (West 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.20.5 
(West 2012); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1024.5 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & 
Empl. § 3-711 (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (West 2012); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt (West 2011); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/15 (West 
2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7 (West 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
19.182.020 (West 2007). 
200. See Michael Z. Green, Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title 
VII After Forty Years: The Promise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. 
L.J. 937, 940 (2005); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and 
Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 YALE L. J. 1757, 1764 (2003); Joseph 
C. Feldman, Note, Standing and Delivering on Title VII's Promises: White 
Employees' Ability to Sue Employers for Discrimination Against Nonwhites, 
25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 569, 600 (1999) (“For many whites, before 
they endorse policies that benefit nonwhites and make the possibility of Title 
VII suits a real deterrent to employers who would discriminate, they must 
37
  
1044 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:3 
 
total respondents in a national Gallup poll identified 
“unemployment/jobs” as the most important problem facing the 
country today.201 And, while black, Hispanic, senior, and low-
income respondents are particularly concerned about 
unemployment, it is an issue that cuts across all segments.202 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Unemployment is a significant issue in contemporary 
America. But the rise of anti-unemployment discrimination 
legislation does not appear to address the scarcity of jobs and, 
thus, is unlikely to reduce unemployment in the aggregate. 
However, the legislation might have an overall positive effect 
by reducing arbitrary discrimination in hiring and long-term 
unemployment, which have negative impacts on the economy. 
Additionally, the legislation expresses a set of social values 
about fairness and hard work. And the legislation protects 
members of constitutionally-protected groups who likely are 
disproportionately impacted by current-employment 
requirements. In sum, an objective look at anti-unemployment 
discrimination reveals that it is a positive example of interest 
convergence that might not have all the benefits that its 
proponents claim but is not just a placebo and also has very 
little—if any—downside. 
 
believe that their own self-interests are furthered.”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1980) (arguing that the “interest of blacks in 
achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with 
the interests of whites”). 
201. See Most Important Problem, supra note 9. 
202. Saad, supra note 12. 
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